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To model, from its inception, interenterprise network formation and
its interaction with foreign investment across an entire epoch of
rapid and profound economic transformation, the authors gathered
data on the complete ownership histories of 1,696 of the largest
Hungarian enterprises from 1987 to 2001. They develop a social
sequence analysis to identify distinctive pathways whereby firms
use network resources to buffer uncertainty, hide or restructure as-
sets, or gain knowledge and legitimacy. During this period, net-
worked property grew, stabilized, and involved a growing propor-
tion of foreign capital. Cohesive networks of recombinant property
were robust, and in fact integrated foreign investment. Although
multinationals, through their subsidiaries, dissolved ties in joint ven-
ture arrangements, the authors find evidence that they also built
durable networks. These findings suggest that developing economies
do not necessarily face a forced choice between networks of global
reach and those of local embeddedness.
Social structures often are made to seem the antipodes to, or
at least unrelated to details and nuances of, sequencing in tim-
ing. This is in part because of the influence of structuralism.
Social times should instead be accounted as much part of struc-
ture as are network spaces.—Harrison White (1992)
Business organizations today must cope with the challenges of a trans-
forming global economy. Markets are volatile, technological change is
rapid, and capital is mobile on an increasingly global scale. In settings of
1 Research for this article was supported by a grant from the National Science Foun-
dation (SES-01-36995). We also acknowledge the support of the Russell Sage Foun-
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radical uncertainty, economic sociologists point to how firms cooperate in
networks of strategic alliance (Kogut and Walker 2001; Powell et al. 2005;
Stuart 1998; Uzzi 1997). New research in the sociology of development
similarly addresses network conceptions of organization. Whether atten-
tive to networks of “developmental associations” (Evans 1995), to “global
commodity chains” (Gereffi and Fonda 1992), or to new conceptions of
multinational corporations as transnational networks (Ghoshal and Bart-
lett 1990; Hedlund 1993), new research shifts focus from decision-making
structures of boundedly rational actors to the structure of ties in which
organizations are embedded (Morgan, Kristensen, and Whitley 2001). Sus-
tainable growth is more likely, research suggests, where the subsidiaries
of foreign companies are embedded in network ties within the host econ-
omy, as locals and foreigners alike recognize that business networks can
be viewed as a strategic resource (Bair and Gereffi 2003; Dicken, Forsgren,
and Malmberg 1994). From the earlier question of how a national economy
is integrated into the global economy, a new agenda for the field of eco-
nomic development asks whether and how foreign investment is inte-
grated into the local networks of host economies.
This article furthers that agenda by analyzing the evolution of a national
network of interorganizational ownership ties in its relationship to foreign
direct investment (FDI). Can high levels of foreign investment be com-
patible with interenterprise ownership networks in a developing economy?
Our analysis is conducted in a setting strategically chosen for extraordi-
narily high levels of foreign investment in a situation where domestic
firms were forming diverse interorganizational ownership networks in
response to high levels of uncertainty in their business environment—
conditions marking the postsocialist Hungarian economy between 1987
and 2001. Our case represents one of the most rapid and far-reaching
transformations of a national economy. During this period, the institutions
of the Hungarian economy were fundamentally reorganized from plan-
ning to market coordination. The system of property was similarly trans-
formed: our data reveal that state ownership of the large firm sector
declined from 98% in 1987 to 15% in 2001, and the share of the large
firm sector that was foreign owned rose from only 1% in 1987 to 53% in
2001.
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To analyze how FDI interacts with evolving network structures, we
gathered data on the complete ownership network histories of 1,696 of
the largest Hungarian enterprises from 1987 to 2001. This time frame
yields comprehensive coverage of the Hungarian economic transforma-
tion, reaching back to the moment when firms could register as corpo-
rations and encompassing the institutionalization of private property, mar-
ket coordination, and foreign investment. Our time frame thus includes
the entire period in which firms were privatized and new regulatory frame-
works were established governing banking, bankruptcy, accounting, con-
tracting, and corporate governance. We are therefore able to study, from
its inception, network formation across an entire epoch of economic
transformation.
We record network formation starting from the very first ownership
ties made in a nascent market economy, where the legal possibility of
creating an interfirm ownership tie coincides with the starting point of
our data collection. We then follow network evolution over the turbulent
years of postsocialism into market stabilization and the massive inflow
of foreign investment. We will be especially attentive to differences be-
tween vertically organized business networks and those with more hor-
izontal patterns of cohesion. We identify the emergence of varieties of
both vertical and cohesive structures, and we follow these structures across
time to understand their durability and openness to foreign investment.
By utilizing the histories of firm network embeddedness, we are able to
model how foreign investment interacts with these network forms.
To do so, we develop analytic tools that reconcile the structural focus
of social network analysis with the historical orientation of sequence anal-
ysis. In combining the two approaches, we begin with the element that
each shares—the notion that meaning is given by context (Abbott 1997).
For the network analyst, no tie has meaning in itself. To interpret a tie,
the analyst must understand its location in social space. In network anal-
ysis, context is topographic. For sequence analysts, as for historical so-
ciologists more generally, no event has meaning in itself. The meaning of
an action, an event, a social formation, or a relationship must be under-
stood in its temporal context. In the theoretical approach that we are
developing, structure is identified at the intersection of topographic and
temporal contexts. As a parallel to social network analysis, we develop a
social sequence analysis. To do so we study variation in the sequences of
local network positions. Our combination of network analysis and se-
quence analysis is, thus, not merely additive: in striving to make network
analysis historical we also seek to make sequence analysis relational. At
the basis of our project of historical network analysis is a reconstruction
of the network sequences of 1,696 firms. Identifying distinctive pathways
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through a network space, we argue, is a way to understand processes of
network evolution.
Our analysis indicates, first, that high levels of FDI are compatible with
the persistence of domestic interenterprise ownership networks. Global-
ization and the reproduction of network embeddedness are not necessarily
mutually opposing processes. Second, we find that the Hungarian econ-
omy is not a dual-segregated economy composed of domestic firms that
are networked and foreign-controlled firms that are isolated. In fact, the
proportion of Hungary’s mixed economy that is controlled by foreign
owners and linked to domestic ownership networks has been increasing
from 1991 to 2001. By 2001, only 30% of foreign capital is invested in
subsidiaries that have never been part of ownership networks. Foreign-
owned firms were just as likely to have ties to domestically owned firms
as to other foreign-owned firms: we find no evidence for segregation. We
find, third, that network forms of “recombinant property” (Stark 1996)
are robust throughout the period. Notably, one variant of recombinant
property, characterized by cohesive network structures, is most likely to
involve the participation of foreign investment. More than a mere legacy
of state socialism, these network forms are a viable organizational re-
sponse to the challenges of an internationalized economy. Fourth, using
logistic regression analysis we find that the odds of involving sizable
foreign ownership differ significantly across distinctive pathways of net-
work positions. Fifth, we find that the subsidiaries of foreign multina-
tionals are not simply joining existing network structures but are actively
participating in network creation and growth. In Hungary, foreign in-
vestment and network evolution are intertwined processes.
The next section presents the basic contours of our case—the Hungarian
economy after the collapse of state socialism, the subsequent emergence
of interenterprise networks, the demise of state ownership, and the rise
of foreign investment. Following this discussion, we then frame our the-
oretical and methodological contribution as an attempt to model the struc-
ture of network practices through combined attention to topography and
temporality. After describing our data collection, we chart the changing
proportions of the Hungarian economy that are foreign or domestic and
networked or isolated.
To identify the microprocesses of interorganizational network formation
that explain the macrostructural outcomes, we move to modeling that
makes sequences of network positions the unit of analysis. The meth-
odological innovation at the core of this study is to combine the tools of
sequence analysis and network analysis to yield a sequence analysis of
changing network positions. We first define discrete forms of embedded-
ness. These local network topographies are the building blocks to identify
sequences of changes in forms of embeddedness for each of the firms in
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our population. Next, we describe the optimal matching operations for
grouping firms on the basis of similarities in sequence patterns through
that network space. Using logistic regression analysis we test our prop-
osition that foreign ownership can be explained not simply by the shape
of network structures but by the sequencing of network positions. We
then discuss in detail the typical pathways and their coevolution with
foreign investment. Recognizing that relational resources can be used for
different organizing purposes, we interpret the temporal patterns of net-
work properties to understand the interdependent practices of Hungarian
managers and foreign investors.
THE DOMESTIC EMBEDDEDNESS OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT
Emergence of Interenterprise Ownership Networks
The postsocialist economies of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet
Union offer a striking laboratory to study processes of network formation
in a period of rapid and far-reaching economic change. In their extrication
from state socialism, postsocialist firms confronted highly uncertain po-
litical, economic, and institutional environments. With the demise of the
old COMECON (Council for Mutual Economic Assistance) alliance that
regulated trade among the socialist economies, firms watched the collapse
of their once-secure trading partners. Literally within a month, and not
at the margin but in overwhelming proportions, they had to seek new
suppliers and new customers. They would do so in an institutional en-
vironment of extreme complexity. Newly elected democratic governments
were dismantling the socialist planning apparatus and launching ambi-
tious programs of privatization. From one month to the next, government
agencies promulgated regulations governing banking, bankruptcy, ac-
counting, contracting, FDI, and corporate governance. For firms remain-
ing in state ownership, for recently “privatized” firms, and for new start-
up firms alike, the challenge was to navigate through a maze of new
policies in which contradictory regulations and inconsistent enforcement
produced ambiguity about which rules and which games were operating.
Earlier work (Stark 1996) drew on insights that interorganizational ties
might provide means to cope with highly uncertain environments. Based
on data gathered through complementary research methods (ethnographic
research in firms, the analysis of government agency documents, and the
analysis of the ownership records of the 200 largest Hungarian enterprises
and top 25 banks in 1994), this work identified an ensemble of practices
labeled recombinant property. Interenterprise ownership networks were
a response to uncertainty (Stark 1996) and served as a strategy to spread
risk (see also Johnson 1997; McDermott 1997; Ro´na-Tas 1998; Spicer,
This content downloaded from 128.59.160.233 on Fri, 6 Mar 2015 12:50:20 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
American Journal of Sociology
1372
McDermott, and Kogut 2000; Bo¨ro¨cz 2001; Vedres 2000). Like mountain
climbers assaulting a treacherous face, postsocialist firms used networks
of cross-ownership as the safety ropes binding them together.
Along with identifying and labeling this new process came the warning
that recombinant property might increase chances of survival without
increasing profitability. Some firms were diversifying their portfolio of
resources (blurring the boundaries of public and private) for the purpose
of socializing liabilities while privatizing assets (Stark 1996, pp. 1012–15).
Similarly, business group networks were a means not only of risk spread-
ing but of risk shedding in a context in which policies of credit worthiness
and debt forgiveness were highly politicized (Stark 1996, pp. 1009–12).
Thus, networked assets could facilitate productive restructuring; but they
also offered avenues to exploit ambiguities in regulations and offload
liabilities to the taxpayer in state-sponsored programs of bank bailouts
and debt forgiveness (Stark 1996).2
The research on recombinant property was conducted while levels of
foreign investment were modest, during the period of uncertainty when
new regulatory frameworks had been introduced but were not yet insti-
tutionalized. Since then, extrication from state socialism has been decisive:
the planned economy and the dominance of state ownership have been
systematically dismantled. Similarly, the entrance of foreign investment
has been massive: the Hungarian economy today is arguably one of the
most globalized economies in the world. What, then, has happened to
interorganizational ownership networks over the entire period of trans-
formation from 1987 to 2001?
Foreign Investment Meets Postsocialist Networks
The existing literature on foreign investment and network forms in post-
socialist settings suggests at least three possibilities. One possibility is that
the shock of system change will produce early patterns of network for-
mation that reach a tipping point to a self-reinforcing dynamic of almost
unchecked network growth. Business groups would be strong, partly be-
cause they are densely connected and also because they link deeply into
the political class. These domestic networks might then lock out foreign
capital, perhaps even dispelling some initial foreign investors.3 In terms
of the relative proportions of the economy that are networked or isolated,
2 “Centralized management of liabilities will not continue indefinitely, but the orga-
nizational dynamics of enterprises formed under the new paternalistic conditions are
likely to have strong path-dependent effects” (Stark 1996, p. 1012).
3 For the Hungarian case, where we know that foreign investment continued to grow,
this first scenario is obviously counterfactual but, nonetheless, heuristically useful.
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foreign or domestic, this would be a case where, at the extreme, almost
everything is networked and domestically controlled. Even the modest
levels of foreign investment would be bound to domestic business groups.
This process of network crowding would correspond to the antidevel-
opmental lines of the contemporary Russian economy analyzed by Bur-
awoy (Burawoy 1996; Burawoy and Krotov 1992) and others (Johnson
1997; Zon 1998).
A second possibility is that extraordinarily high levels of foreign in-
vestment will lead to the eradication of interenterprise ownership. This
expectation corresponds closely to the view of Hanley, King, and To´th
(2002) who, in challenging the recombinant-property approach, argue that
interenterprise ownership networks were a transient and fleeting phe-
nomenon, confined to the period immediately following the collapse of
state socialism. The eradication of these interenterprise ownership ties,
according to Hanley and his coauthors, has been carried out by “private
parties” exercising “clear and unambiguous ownership rights” (Hanley et
al. 2002, p. 140)—in particular by foreign investors who, in their view,
desire strong and unambiguous lines of control, undiluted by ownership
network ties. Interenterprise ownership links that preceded foreign in-
vestment would be broken up when foreigners acquired firms through
the privatization process. Moreover, given the powerful influence of for-
eign firms (rich in resources—financial, managerial, and ideological), their
predilection to shun network ties would rapidly diffuse throughout the
economy. The result of the direct actions of the foreign multinationals as
well as of these indirect demonstration effects would be, at the extreme,
an economy opposite to the first possibility—almost nothing would be
networked.
A third expectation describes a segregated, dual economy as increasing
levels of foreign investment leads to a radical separation between foreign
and domestic firms. Foreign investment, in this view, results in “cathedrals
in the desert” (Grabher 1994; Hardy 1998; Pavlinek and Smith 1998; Uhlir
1998). These are platform operations importing semifinished parts to be
assembled locally for export. Whereas Hanley et al. (2002) take a positive
view of the absence of ties, in the dual economy model it is the very
absence of connectedness between foreign and domestic firms that is the
root of the problem (Comisso 1998). FDI leaves the domestic economy
untouched, thereby maintaining underdevelopment. The absence of ties
perpetuates a segregated economy, malevolent because its radical sepa-
ration allows no positive influence across sectors. A case where foreign
investors do not make network ties and where the networks of domestic
firms grow only among themselves (Zysman and Schwartz 1998) would
correspond to a radically segregated, dual economy in which FDI is over-
whelmingly isolated and domestic firms are predominantly networked.
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With our data we can chart the proportions of the Hungarian mixed
economy that are (1) networked and foreign, (2) networked and domestic,
(3) isolated and foreign, and (4) isolated and domestic.4 The findings,
reported for the entire period in a subsequent section below, are at odds
with each of the three scenarios: by 2001, large firm capital was distributed
across the four cells in roughly equal proportions. Domestic networks
have not crowded out FDI, and multinationals have not eradicated the
networks, but Hungary is also not a radically segregated dual economy.
This constellation of the macrostructure of ownership suggests that
other processes are at play than those outlined in the scenarios above.
The challenge, then, is to understand the processes whereby some foreign
capital becomes integrated while other foreign capital becomes isolated,
and how some network formations survive without foreign capital while
other network formations develop with the participation of foreign in-
vestors. In short, what are the social processes that produced these mac-
rostructural outcomes?
A Social Sequence Approach to Foreign Embeddedness
Our approach identifies processes that explain the integration of foreign
investment in interorganizational ownership networks. We organize the
analytical building blocks along two dimensions: topographical and tem-
poral. Along the first dimension, we start from the insight of network
analysis that network structures can differ in their topographical prop-
erties. Therefore, rather than simply identifying whether a given firm is
embedded or not embedded in network ties, we probe for qualitative
differences in types of embeddedness. Because we focus on network prop-
erties from the perspective of the individual firm, we are interested in
variations in local network structures.
In locating the position of a given firm within distinctive local topog-
raphies, we distinguish structures that are more vertically organized with
greater centralization from those that are more horizontally organized
with greater cohesiveness. Recent empirical research on the shape of busi-
ness networks across a variety of institutional settings has demonstrated
that more cohesive, horizontal structures outperform more centralized,
vertical forms. In the field of biotechnology, Powell and his coauthors
(Powell et al. 2005) found that actors that are embedded in horizontal
rather than hierarchical networks were more likely to be innovative. In
her study of interorganizational networks in China, Keister (1998) found
that nonhierarchical business groups were more buffered from uncer-
4 In place of the former dichotomy of public vs. private, we redefine the term “mixed
economy” along the foreign/domestic and networked/isolated dimensions.
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tainties and outperformed centralized groups. Similarly, in Russia,
whereas defensive strategies of survival correspond to centralized business
groups, entrepreneurial groups (often with foreign involvement) were
more horizontal in structure (Huber and Wo¨rgo¨tter 1998).
The identification of the two prevalent forms of interenterprise own-
ership networks in the early part of the 1990s specifically pointed to the
emergence of distinctively vertical and horizontal network structures
(Stark 1996, 2001). The first form of recombinant property networks in-
volved processes in which large state-owned or formerly state-owned en-
terprises spun off corporate satellites (some of which were still of consid-
erable size, spinning off their own satellites), resulting in star-shaped
networks with the very largest firms at the hubs. Along these vertical ties,
firms shifted assets and liabilities in frequently shady arrangements that
took advantage of shifting government policies (Voszka 1997). The second
type of interenterprise ownership networks involved networks of greater
density, resulting in decentered, more cohesive structures. Unlike the sim-
ple star-periphery structures, firms in these networks regrouped interde-
pendent assets and restructured enterprises.
Just as domestic firms faced the uncertainties of postsocialism, so foreign
actors faced uncertainties entering an emerging market. Our reading of
the recent literature on foreign investment (Inkpen and Beamish 1997;
Kogut 1988, 1991; Yiu and Makino 2002; Zaheer 1995) suggests that some
foreign investors use ownership network ties to learn the rules of play,
legitimize their presence, obtain local knowledge, and gain introduction
into social networks by having a local partner. Forming a joint venture,
for example, means that a foreign investor establishes a strong network
tie (in the form of shared ownership) with a local firm to obtain legitimacy
in the eyes of domestic economic actors, national policy makers, and local
officials. Such network ties are potential avenues to obtain local knowl-
edge, especially under conditions when the regulatory environment is
untested, where domestic markets have culturally specific features (e.g.,
involving tastes or practices in advertising, marketing, packaging, etc.),
or where basic infrastructural logistics (e.g., utilities, transportation, etc.)
have locally idiosyncratic features.5
Following this earlier work on recombinant-property network struc-
tures (Stark 1996, 2001), we posit two distinctive patterns of network
5 There are indications that the operation of business networks might be compatible
with the structure and practices of multinational firms. To cope with challenges of
organizing across geographical and cultural distances, multinationals are increasingly
structured as networks (Ghoshal and Bartlett 1990; Morgan et al. 2001), seeking flex-
ibility trough empowering subsidiaries and embedding in interorganizational relations
(Buckley and Casson 1998). Hedlund (1993), e.g., suggests that multinational corpo-
rations are more heterarchical than hierarchical.
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formation in the extrication from state socialism: star-periphery structures
and cohesive network structures. Following Kogut and others, we posit
that a significant number of foreign investors will forge network ties with
domestic partners. A key research question, then, is whether and how the
vertical and horizontal variants of recombinant property (in network-
analytic terms, centralized vs. cohesive structures) figured in the strategies
of foreign investors. Were foreign investors attracted to star-shaped net-
works because of their structural isomorphism to hierarchical supplier
networks, or did they avoid these because of their historical origins as
vehicles of asset stripping and liability management? Did foreign investors
avoid entering cohesive and densely networked structures because they
are cautious about the entanglements of such embeddedness, or did they
prefer these structures because of their managerial entrepreneurialism?
Answering these questions requires that we add a temporal dimension
to our topographical dimension. Foreign investment in Hungary was not
immediately triggered by the collapse of communism; it was meager at
the outset and developed as an incremental process across the entire epoch.
To answer whether foreign owners opted for vertical or horizontal struc-
tures, or shunned both, we must therefore first examine whether either
or both of these structures had any lasting durability to be available to
foreign investment. By adding a temporal dimension to our analysis we
can thus make more meaningful inferences about the relationship between
network properties and organizing practices. In our study, we identify
topography as a static property; we grasp structure as a temporal property
identified as a sequence of network positions.
Building on recent efforts to bring dynamics into network analysis
(Brudner and White 1997; Snijders 2001; Stuart 1998; Watts 1999; White
2004), we draw on sequence analysis, a recently developed research tool
that makes it possible to study historical processes in an eventful way
similar to historiography while retaining social scientific abstraction (Ab-
bott and Hrycak 1990; Abbott 1995; Han and Moen 1999; Blair-Loy 1999;
Stovel, Savage, and Bearman 1996; Giuffre 1999; Stovel 2001).
With attention to temporal sequencing, we can pose and answer ques-
tions about whether experiences and strategies in the early period of ex-
trication from state socialism had consequences for later developments.
This is especially important in Hungary where the challenges facing firms
were not of the same kind throughout the time frame of our investigation.
In particular, the political and institutional uncertainties of the early 1990s
did not continue unabated throughout the entire epoch. Important de-
cisions by the neoliberal socialist government during the middle of the
decade had emphatic policy outcomes that largely brought ad hoc gov-
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ernment subsidies and bailouts to an end.6 With the institutionalization
of regulatory policies of corporate governance, banking, and bankruptcy,
for example, uncertainties in the institutional environment were replaced
by the “normal” uncertainties of a market environment.
Given this changing historical context, we need to probe the durability
of positions in vertical and horizontal topographies. A firm with a durable
position in a cohesive structure (C), for example, will evidence a relatively
lengthy sequence in the same network position (C-C-C) across a number
of years; the sequence of a firm remaining on the periphery (P) of a vertical
structure will register as P-P-P, and so on. Because of the environment
changes during the epoch under investigation, we will be especially at-
tentive to positional durability that begins during the earlier period and
survives into the later period. Specifically, we expect to find a significant
number of firms in durable positions in vertical and horizontal topog-
raphies, respectively, and we expect to find such durability extending
across the 1995–96 boundary between the earlier and later periods. More-
over, we specifically hypothesize that sequence pathways characterized
by durable positions in vertical structures will be significantly less likely
to attract foreign owners than firms in durable positions in cohesive
structures.
The reasoning behind our hypothesis starts with the observations of
Powell, Keister, and others that less hierarchically organized business
networks offer real performance benefits over vertically structured net-
works. Their multiplexity provides greater opportunities to adapt more
flexibly to changes in the environment. Although vertical structures might
be well adapted to a given environment, they are more prone to “lock-
in.” That is, their centralized character increases the likelihood of tem-
porally self-reinforcing processes in which patterns that were successful
in an initial context persist even though there is no longer a performance
advantage.
Foreign investors, we reason, are not averse to centralized, hierarchical
structures. But, faced with two already established network structures,
they will choose to gain ownership stakes in firms that have durable
positions in the less hierarchical, more cohesive network topographies.
This choice is especially likely in the Hungarian setting. More horizontally
structured business networks can provide resources to cope with the chal-
lenges of the initial postsocialist period, and they can be more easily
repurposed if and when the political, institutional, and business environ-
6 The middle of the decade (1995–96) marked a key turning point in historical processes.
A restrictive package in 1995 ended government bailouts and state paternalism (Stark
and Bruszt 1998), and 1996 was the first year when GDP started growing after the
postsocialist collapse.
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ment changes. Firms in positions within such cohesive topographies that
endure across the time frame are, thus, likely to be strong candidates for
foreign investment. Vertical structures might seem to offer ready avenues
for straightforward command and control, but they are less likely to be
repurposed. They will not be targets for foreign takeover. And the more
they endure into the later period, the less attractive they will become,
leading to yet further temporally self-reinforcing processes that result in
a kind of network stasis with little foreign investment.
Thus, although we start from the notion that network ties are strategic
resources for firms (Kogut, Shan, and Walker 1992), we do not assume
that all firms have the same strategic orientations or that firms participate
in network ties in the same way. Network properties vary not only across
firms in network space but also across time. As firms make and break
ties, they (and those around them in network space) can reproduce or
reshape network properties. As they do, they produce distinctive sequences
of network structures. That is, just as we will be attentive to variation
in the specific shapes of the network properties in a given firm’s network
locale, so we will also be attentive to variation in social times. Network
times and network spaces, separately and in their combination, are struc-
turing—they enable and constrain how network ties can be deployed as
resources.
We therefore posit that patterns of foreign investment can be explained
not simply by the shape of network structures but by the structures of
their sequencing. To test this proposition we develop an innovative syn-
thesis of network analysis and sequence analysis.
DATA AND TRENDS
Data Collection
The data set we have assembled includes the complete ownership histories
of the largest enterprises in Hungary during the period 1987–2001. We
define a large firm as being in the annual ranking of the top 500 firms
(based on revenue) in any of the years 1987–2001. Our inclusion rule
results in a population of 1,843 firms. For a small country like Hungary,
this population of firms accounts for more than a third of all employment,
half of the GDP, and the overwhelming proportion of export revenues
(Figyelo˝ 2002). The comprehensiveness of our data set is unprecedented
in the literature on changing ownership structures in a transforming
economy.7
7 Research projects on interenterprise ownership networks cover fewer companies, in
less depth, over less time. Ferligoj, Prasnikar, and Pahor (2001), e.g., have analyzed
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Ownership data were transcribed by our research team directly from
the 20 official courts of registry where Hungarian firms are obliged to
register their owners. For each firm we collected the following: equity in
thousands of Hungarian forints, the names of the firm’s top 25 owners,
and the percentage stake that each owner holds in the company. We also
have information on the date when the firm was founded and the date
of filing for bankruptcy, liquidation, or cessation for any reason, that is,
the date when the file of the firm was closed at the registry court. Out of
the 1,843 firms, 147 ownership files were unavailable or contained little
or no information on ownership. Our final data set contains the full own-
ership histories of 1,696 enterprises. For any given firm in any given month
in our data set we can precisely identify the owners and the percentage
of the assets each holds.
We define a tie as an ownership stake that one enterprise in our pop-
ulation holds in another firm in the population. Our definition is restricted
to direct ties (representing at least a 1% ownership stake) among the largest
Hungarian enterprises. It does not include, for example, the numerous
ownership stakes that these firms have in smaller companies. Nor do we
report two firms as tied if they share a common owner, as in the more
inclusive definitions of affiliation networks (Kogut and Walker 2001; Was-
serman and Faust 1994). It follows that, in our population of firms, an
ownership stake by the state or a foreign owner does not constitute an
interorganizational tie. We have also coded owners by type, using the
names of owners to classify four categories: state, Hungarian firm, Hun-
garian person, and foreign owner.
The Changing Proportions of the Mixed Economy
Our data set makes it possible to chart the changing configuration of the
macrostructure of ownership across 15 years of Hungary’s transforming
and globalizing economy. Did domestic networks grow unchecked? Did
foreign investment eradicate interenterprise ownership ties? Or is Hun-
gary a dual economy, segregated into two segments of domestically net-
worked and foreign isolates?
To gain a picture of the evolving shape of Hungary’s mixed economy,
the networks of the largest Slovenian companies based on ownership and board in-
terlock ties in 1997 and 2000. However, their analysis was cross-sectional, and their
sample was limited only to the top 150 firms in each of the two years in their study.
Both of these studies were cross-sectional. Several studies outside the East European
region examine panel data. Kogut and Walker (2001), e.g., study ties among 550 of
the largest firms in the German economy, 1994–97. Keister (2001) examines 535 Chinese
firms, 1988–96. Her data involve 40 named and already identified business groups in
which the location of a given firm in a given business group is fixed by lists from 1985.
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for each year from 1987 to 2001 we computed the proportion of large
firm capital in four categories: (1) firms that are isolated and domestically
owned, (2) firms that are isolated and have significant foreign ownership,
(3) firms with an interenterprise ownership tie and that are domestically
owned, and (4) firms with an interenterprise ownership tie and significant
foreign ownership. A significant foreign owner, in our definition, is a
clearly dominant owner or, at least, a coalition partner in ownership (see
app. A for definitions).
Figure 1 presents the broad contours of the changing shape of Hun-
gary’s mixed economy across the period under study. It illustrates that
alternative scenarios were open possibilities from 1991. Selective extrap-
olation from early trends in different categories could yield very different
expected outcomes. For example, between 1989 and 1991, the networked-
domestic category increased from 27% to 57%. Selective extrapolation
from this dramatic growth could have suggested that networked-domestic
firms would crowd out other forms of property including foreign own-
ership, perhaps along the antidevelopmental lines of the Russian economy
(Burawoy and Krotov 1992; Johnson 1997). Similarly, focusing on the
growth of the isolated foreign category, nearly doubling between 1989
(8%) to 1990 (15% of large firm capitalization), one could have selectively
extrapolated an economy dominated by foreigners and the extinction of
domestic network forms of property (Hanley et al. 2002). The high rate
of growth of both the isolated-foreign and networked-domestic categories
could have encouraged predictions about an emerging segregated dual
economy (Comisso 1998).
Our findings indicate that each of the scenarios would fail to account
for actual developments. In a segregated dual economy, the overwhelming
majority of firm capital would be in two categories: networked domestic
and isolated foreign. But Hungary is not a segregated dual economy,8 and
yet neither is it an economy dominated by isolates, nor by the networked
domestic. In 2001, the distribution of capital among the four categories
was the following: isolated domestic, 18%; isolated foreign, 29%; net-
worked domestic, 26%; and networked foreign, 26%. Although the iso-
lated foreign-owned firms constitute the largest category, this segment of
the mixed economy contains only three percentage points more capital
than the foreign-owned networked category of firms.
Although the proportion of the economy that participates in interen-
8 We tested the hypothesis that the foreign-owned and the domestically owned segments
are not connected by network ties. Chi-square tests of the distribution of ties between
and within these segments are insignificant (the smallest P-value for any year is .419).
Ties between foreign-owned and domestically owned firms are just as likely as ties
within these segments.
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terprise ownership ties becomes smaller, it does not—in contrast to the
arguments of the transition school—dissolve. By the end of our study,
52% of capitalization was in firms with at least one interorganizational
ownership tie with another large firm in the sample. Moreover, there is
evidence indicating that the strength of a given tie has increased. In the
first years of our period an average network tie represented a 20% own-
ership stake in a company. By 2001, the average tie strength is 36%,
suggesting the consolidation rather than the dissolution of the network.
Unanticipated and unexplained by any of the three competing scenarios
is the steady growth, between 1991 and 2001, of the networked-foreign
category, eventually comprising half of the networked capital.
SOCIAL SEQUENCE ANALYSIS OF NETWORK EVOLUTION
Studies of property transformation in the postsocialist setting typically
focus on broad changes in the structure of property in terms of ownership
categories such as state ownership, private ownership, foreign ownership,
and the like. Although our macrostructural model adopted a similarly
categorical approach, the microprocessual models that we develop below
examine the structure of property in relational terms, focusing on its
network properties. Whereas much of the recent work on network dy-
namics has focused on topographic properties of the global network, in
particular its properties of connectedness, we start from the perspective
of the individual firm and analyze its network position within a field of
local action.
To isolate the distinctive processes and the variable social times that
might be masked by system-level investigations, we identify patterned
variation in sequences of events in the lives of firms. These events are
changes in the configuration of the network properties of its local field of
action. To proceed, we identify the empirically observable types of local
embeddedness and elaborate the methods used to cluster sequences into
typical pathways through that network space.
Identifying Local Network Positions
In analyzing the evolution of interenterprise ownership ties in Hungary,
we study topography at a socially meaningful level of action. Ownership
networks, we reason, differ from networks of flow. In such networks,
where electricity, rumors, or contagious disease can spread along any
number of steps, the most important task is to understand the global
configuration of the network, the redundancy of connecting paths, and
the overall structure of reachability. Ownership networks, however, have
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a shorter range (path distance beyond which there is no interrelatedness).
Path distances beyond two steps (the owners of owners) have little im-
portance: whereas the owner of the owner can be important, the owner
of the owner of the owner has little influence in the life of a postsocialist
firm. Therefore, we focus on the shapes of local network configurations,
building up from ties of the focal firm and of its near network neighbors.
Accordingly, we ignore the directionality of ties and use the symmetrized
ownership network.
In defining local network topographies we do not posit particular shapes
or configurations in advance. Instead, we begin by defining the dimensions
along which focal firms’ network topographies can vary. Starting from a
set of elemental dimensions and applying a clustering algorithm, we iden-
tify a finite set of distinctive local network properties. For a given firm,
for any year in which it existed, we can then code its position within a
local topography. In place of the topographic properties of the global
network for each of the 15 years in our study, our analysis is conducted
on 18,073 cases (i.e., one network position for each firm in every year that
it existed). The unit of analysis is, thus, the local network position of a
given firm in a given year.
We define dimensions of local network topographies in line with findings
of the literature on interorganizational networks and business groups.
Granovetter (1994), for example, identifies the key structural dimensions
of interorganizational networks as, first of all, the size of a firm’s network
as well as the configuration of its ties, especially the level of cohesion and
the degree of centralization. These insights informed empirical research
on the shape of business networks. As Powell et al. (2005) found for
biotechnology, Keister (1998) found for China, and Huber and Wo¨rgo¨tter
(1998) found for Russia, vertical versus horizontal structure is a key di-
mension of network organizing.
To capture these salient features of business networks, we define four
dimensions along which local network topographies can vary. To capture
size, we define the first dimension as (1) the number of alters in the focal
firm’s ego network. To capture the structural configurations of ties, we
define three additional dimensions: (2) the average size of all alters’ ego
networks, (3) the cohesion of the focal firm’s network, and (4) the average
number of cohesive paths in all alters’ ego networks.
Measuring cohesion in ownership networks (dimensions 3 and 4) is less
straightforward than measuring size (dimensions 1 and 2). One starting
point would be to use a clustering coefficient that measures the proportion
of alters connected to one another in ego’s network (Watts 1999; Davis
1970). The assumption of this measure is that the basis of cohesion is
triadic closure as, for example, when two friends of a third person become
friends of each other. However, an ownership network is different from
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a friendship network: while closed triads are uncommon, firms in cohesive
ownership networks are often tied in linked quadruplets (four firms con-
nected by at most two-step paths).9 Thus, we take both direct ties (one-
step paths) and two-step paths into account in estimating the number of
alters connected.10
Emphatically, it is not the individual dimensions but the patterns across
them that define the discrete shape of a given topography. Therefore, after
measuring these four dimensions for each of the firm-years in our pop-
ulation, we run Ward hierarchical cluster analysis (Ward 1963) on those
18,073 cases to identify patterns in the data. This cluster analysis groups
cases according to their similarity across the four dimensions.
Table 1 presents the seven typical local network topographies derived
by the cluster analysis: isolate, dyad, small star periphery, large star pe-
riphery, star center, cohesive cluster, and strongly cohesive group.11 In the
fourth column of table 1 we report, for each topography, the mean scores
along our four dimensions. There we see, for example, that although the
number of ties in the ego networks of small star periphery and large star
periphery structures are nearly the same, the mean size of their alters’
networks is markedly different.12 Star centers and star peripheries, of
course, lack cohesion, but the cluster analysis further distinguishes a to-
pography that is cohesive from one that has extraordinarily strong group
cohesion.
9 Ownership networks are, moreover, typically sparser than friendship networks. For
a discussion see Kogut and Walker (2001).
10 Commonly used clustering coefficients (Davis 1970; Watts 1999) record the proportion
of alters that are connected. We decided to use the number rather than the proportion
of alters connected. The reason for this is that cohesion enters into our cluster analysis
alongside size—measured as the number of alters. Using the proportion of connected
alters as the measure of cohesion in this cluster analysis would seriously underweight
this dimension.
11 We tested the hypothesis that network transformation in this case is a product of a
merely random process. This hypothesis is a plausible one, especially given the pace
of institutional transformation. Firms might resort to forming ad hoc ties when pressed
to hedge against radical uncertainties. Similarly, network ties might be cut at random
when, e.g., a new owner appears. To evaluate the random network change hypothesis
we ran simulations from which we conclude that the observed changes in network
ties are not products of a random process. (See app. B for details.)
12 The break point between these two topographies was not determined a priori. In-
stead, it was empirically observable in the data. The distribution of star sizes in our
data is bimodal with the two modal types represented by the two clusters (small star
periphery and large star periphery).
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a White node indicates local network position in graph illustrations.
Optimal Matching Analysis of Network Sequences
The particular type of embeddedness for any given firm, in any given
year, is now categorized as one of the seven positions. The network history
of a firm can now be represented as a sequence of topographies. Figure
2 is an example of a firm’s history as it moves from one type of embed-
dedness to another.
This firm starts as an isolate. After three years, it becomes the periphery
of a small star. In 1992 the topography of the firm’s local network is a
cohesive cluster, and after three years, these network ties are transformed
into a strongly cohesive group. In 1998 the firm becomes a small star
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periphery again. At the end of the period, from 2000, the star shrinks into
a dyad.
On this basis, we have 1,696 such network histories—sequences of
positions—for each of the firms in our population. Some firms’ histories,
of course, are likely to resemble each other (not because they are tied to
each other but because they have similar sequences of network position-
ing) while differing from others. Using an optimal matching algorithm
modified from the analysis of gene sequencing, we construct a matrix of
pairwise distances between each of the sequences.
Optimal matching of sequences is a method that historical sociology
borrowed from natural sciences. The use of optimal matching in the nat-
ural sciences typically does not involve temporality; instead, the sequences
are typically spatial. One major area in natural sciences for the use of
optimal matching is DNA analysis. DNA molecules are considered to be
very similar even when large chunks of the molecular sequence are in
reverse order (Sankoff and Kruskal 1999). Unlike measures based on
vector similarities, optimal matching has some advantages for historical
application, but it has been justifiably criticized by Wu (2000) and others
(Levine 2000) for its lack of sensitivity to the directionality of time. For
example, a firm that is an isolate for eight years and then becomes a small
star periphery in 1995 for the next seven years represents a radically
different career compared to a firm that is a small star periphery for the
first seven years and then becomes an isolate in 1995. Because the default
optimal matching algorithm would group these two cases as similar, we
make adjustments to the parameters of the method to maximize temporal
sensitivity. (See app. C for details about the adjusted parameters used in
our optimal matching analysis.)
We first use optimal matching to find the distance of each sequence
from all others (Rohver and Po¨tter 2002). To the resulting matrix we then
apply hierarchical clustering that groups sequences so that within-cluster
distances are as low as possible and between-cluster distances are high.
From among the commonly used clustering methods, we applied Ward’s
method as the best-fitting clustering solution.13 The combination of these
two algorithms, not unlike the concept of structural equivalence in social
network analysis, yields sequential equivalence (Han and Moen 1999, p.
204).
13 We compare the fit of clustering derived from five algorithms: single link, average
link, complete link, Ward (increase in sum of squares) hierarchical clustering, and
CONCOR divisive clustering. The R2 of a 13-cluster grouping by these methods are
.014, .144, .349, .590, and .411, correspondingly. Thus we use Ward’s method (Wishart
2003) as the one that best fits our data to identify groups of similar sequences. The
clusters that we identify represent a meaningful reduction of the data: the t-test of
comparing within-cluster distances to between-cluster distances is 231.300.
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Using these methods, our social sequence analysis yields 12 distinctive
patterns of sequences, or pathways, through the space of local network
topographies. Reducing 1,696 firm network histories to 12 pathways, we
explain 59% of the variance in intersequence distances, indicating that a
small number of pathways is a suitable representation of network
evolution.
Sequence Pathways and Foreign Investment
The resulting 12 pathways, grouped as five broad types of pathways, are
presented in table 2, briefly summarized here, and more fully elaborated
later. The first two broad types involve the forms of recombinant prop-
erty—the star-shaped spin-off structures and the cohesive groupings, re-
spectively. The third type of pathway is marked by start-up firms. Be-
ginning as small star peripheries or dyads, ties are later broken, and these
firms typically, though not uniformly, exhibit sequences leading toward
isolation. The fourth type shows an entirely different sequence. These are
pathways in which network formation occurs after the period of greatest
institutional uncertainty. Moreover, unlike the pathways in the third fam-
ily, these ties do not dissipate. In fact, they are not only durable but are
evolving from dyads to more complex network topographies. The fifth
type comprises firms that are isolates across the entire period. Firms in
this final pathway are characterized by a later start and are significantly
smaller than firms in other pathways.
Table 2 presents, for each of the pathways, the sequence of network
positions that best represents firm histories in that pathway. (See app. D
for details on identifying representative sequences.) Cell entries (I, D, P,
L, S, C, and G) correspond to the local network topographies defined in
table 1. Enterprise histories are presented in five groups of pathways
according to broad similarities in sequence patterns. The number of firms
in each pathway is one way to measure their prevalence, but as a better
indication of economic importance, we also list the share of each pathway
in the total capitalization of the large firm population in 2001. Recalling
the macrostructure of Hungary’s mixed economy represented in figure 1,
in which the growing percentage of the networked-foreign category is the
most striking feature that was neither anticipated nor explained by the
three competing scenarios, table 2 also reports each pathway’s share of
networked-foreign capital at the close of our study.
To test our proposition that foreign ownership can be explained not
simply by the shape of network structures but by the sequencing of net-
work positions, we use logistic regression to analyze the statistical asso-
ciation between sequence pathways and sizable foreign ownership in 2001.
The definition of our dependent variable, sizable foreign ownership, is
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1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 I I I S S S S S S S S S S S S 7.1 1.4
2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106 P P P P P P P P P P P P 3.8 3.0
Cohesive recombinants:
3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70 I I P* P C C* C C C C C P P P 18.2 36.1
4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44 C C C G G G G* G C C C C C 4.9 12.2
5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65 C C C G G G G G G* G I I I 3.6 0.6
6 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56 I I I I I I I I L L C C G G G 7.0 6.7
Start-ups:
7 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63 P P* P P P P P I I I I I I 3.4 0.0
8 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97 D D* D D* I I I* I I I I I 4.2 0.3
9 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70 P* P P P P D D* D D D D D 3.9 8.6
Second-wave networks:
10 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136 I I I I I I I I D* D D D P P P* 9.1 21.6
11 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101 D* D* P P P 3.3 8.7
Isolates:
12 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 854 I I I I I I* I I I I 30.7 0.0
Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,696 100.0 100.0
Note.—I p isolate, D p dyad member, P p star periphery, L p large star periphery, S p star center, C p cohesive cluster member, G p strongly
cohesive group member.
a Cells indicate network positions from fig. 2.
* Surges in foreign investment when new foreign capital amounted to at least 20% of the total capitalization of the pathway in that year.
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the same here as the previous usage. A sizable foreign owner is a clearly
dominant owner, or, at least, a coalition partner in ownership. (See app.
A for definitions and procedures.)
The first independent variables in our model are the network pathways
identified through optimal matching procedures, with the isolate pathway
as the reference category. We control for three further attributes of firms,
which we expect to be associated with foreign ownership. To rule out that
differences between pathways are simply a function of their industrial
composition, we first control for branch of industry. Our model uses 11
industry categories: agriculture, food industry, energy and mining, chem-
ical industry, heavy industry, light industry and textiles, construction,
wholesale, retail, and finance, with services and transportation as the
reference category. Because foreign ownership might be associated with
the latest topography rather than the sequence of positions, we, second,
control for local network positions in 2001, with isolation as the reference
category. If the inclusion of these variables leads to the loss of significance
of pathway coefficients, then our arguments about sequencing become
questionable. To rule out that foreign ownership in 2001 is simply a func-
tion of early foreign investment, we, third, control for whether there was
sizable foreign ownership in a given firm in 1990. In line with how figure
1 was constructed, in the logistic regression analysis, we weight firms by
their capitalization.
As model 1 in table 3 indicates, our sequence pathways are strongly
associated with foreign ownership. This statistical association holds and,
in fact without exception, becomes stronger when the control variables
are included in model 2. Branch of industry and local network position
at the end of the study are contributing factors in explaining foreign
ownership. The significant association between early foreign ownership
and sizable foreign ownership in 2001 does suggest that foreign investment
displays considerable stickiness. But the statistical association between
pathways and foreign ownership remains robust even when these controls
are introduced.
Turning to the sequence pathways: as we saw in the detailed repre-
sentations of typical sequences in table 2, one of the strongest findings of
our optimal matching analysis is the persistence of the two forms of re-
combinant property. But if each of the forms are robust structures that
survived the entire epoch, table 3 indicates they are strikingly different
in terms of their likelihood to attract considerable foreign investment.
Pathways in which spin-offs locked into star-periphery structures enlisted
hardly any foreign investment. By contrast, two of the pathways with
lengthy sequences of cohesion spanning the 1995–96 boundary were likely
to have sizable foreign ownership in 2001. (Differences across the path-
ways in each of the families are elaborated below.)
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TABLE 3
Sizable Foreign Ownership in 2001: Logistic Regression Estimates
Independent Variables
Sizable Foreign Ownership




1. (I-S) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.513** 5.781**
2. (P) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .422* .785*
Cohesive recombinants:
3. (I-P-C-P) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .065 .622
4. (C-G-C) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .485* 1.112**
5. (C-G-I) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.327** 2.047**
6. (I-L-C-G) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.091** 1.341**
Start-ups:
7. (P-I) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.565** 2.087**
8. (D-I) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .342 1.076**
9. (P-D) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.419** 2.756**
Second-wave networks:
10. (I-D-P) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.218** 1.752**
11. (D-P) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.184** 1.717**
Industry:b
Agriculture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.973**
Food . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.779**
Energy and mining . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .996**
Chemical . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.756**
Heavy industry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.768**
Light industry and textile . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .378
Construction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .517
Wholesale . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .391
Retail . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.695**
Finance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .359
Local network position in 2001:c
D (dyad member) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .720
P (small star periphery) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .097
L (large star periphery) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.892**
S (star center) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .140
C (cohesive cluster member) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .039
G (strongly cohesive group member) . . . . . . 2.737**
Early foreign ownership (1990) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.326**
Constant . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .205** .935**
N . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,286 1,286
2LL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,709.03 1,326.78
R2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .249 .498
% correctly classified . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66.7 74.8
x2 (df) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 302.45 (11) 684.71 (28)
P-value . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .000 .000
a Pathway 12 (isolates) is the omitted category.
b Services and transportation is the omitted category.
c Local network position 1 (isolate) is the omitted category.
* .P ! .10
** .P ! .05
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By themselves, the pathways of the third type might suggest that foreign
ownership is associated with the dissolution of network ties. However,
the pathways in the fourth type, in which we find a second wave of
network formation in the period of institutional stabilization of the market
economy, are also significantly more likely than the isolate pathway to
involve sizable foreign ownership in 2001. These recently emerging new
networks involving foreign owners become organized in small star-
periphery structures. As topographies, they are not dissimilar to those of
the first type, shunned by foreign investors. The contrast exemplifies that
sequence rather than contemporaneous topography matters in explaining
foreign ownership. In the subsections below we discuss these findings in
greater detail with attention to the coevolution of network formation and
foreign investment.
Spin-off star-periphery recombinants in a process of lock-in.—The 140
firms in our first group of two pathways have distinctive histories of nearly
continuous locations in star-periphery topographies. The typical sequences
are lengthy episodes either as star centers (S-S-S-S) or as small star pe-
ripheries (P-P-P-P). These pathways indicate the process by which state-
owned firms spun off corporate satellites in the period of regime change
and its immediate aftermath: by 1990, most of the firms in pathways 1
and 2 were stars or the peripheries of stars.
During the period of high institutional uncertainty in the early years
of postsocialism, the firms in this first group of pathways follow courses
consistent with playing the game of asset-liability management, spinning
off satellites, spreading risk, and shedding risk by shifting assets and
liabilities among them in attempts to take advantage of state-sponsored
programs of debt forgiveness. Of course, not every firm (in the whole
population) that starts its network career as a small star or in its periphery
stays in that position. Some firms will break off (perhaps as dyads), be
sold off (perhaps becoming isolates), or become involved in local networks
with more cohesion. If they did, their network histories will show different
sequences, and they would not have been clustered in this group of path-
ways. The point is that the firms in these two pathways did not break
off, were not sold off, and, for the most part, did not become involved
in more cohesive ties. That is, in these two pathways we see clear evidence
of path dependency: having established a pattern of network ties during
the period of institutional uncertainty, these firms locked into patterns
that endured throughout the epoch even after the organizational envi-
ronment changed (Arthur 1989; Mahoney 2000).
How did they fare? They survived. Did they thrive? By 2001, these
140 firms (i.e., about 8% of the enterprises in the large firm population)
accounted for 10.9% of the total capitalization in that population. They
are a modest but not a negligible segment of the Hungarian economy.
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The Hungarian economy seems to have room even for path-dependent
roads. Did they attract foreign investment? Scarcely. Our findings suggest
that foreign investors shunned these firms. Created in the shadow of the
state and likely facilitating some shady maneuverings, these ties buffered
firms from uncertainty during the extrication from state socialism. But,
locked into these path-dependent ties, the firms in these pathways were
locked out from participating with foreign investors.
Cohesive recombinants repurposed.—Taken by itself, our first group of
pathways might suggest evidence supporting the strong version of the
dual economy thesis with domestic firms networked and foreign firms
isolated. But that notion is quickly dispelled upon examining the network
histories of firms in the second group of pathways. Here we find cohesive
structures that were able to attract foreign investors.
The first part of the network history of the firms in pathway 3, like
those in the first group, indicate the process of spin-offs and state-owned
conglomerates. As separate firms were formed out of the divisions and
workshops of the state-owned enterprises, the size of the ownership stars
grew. But, unlike the pathways in the first group, the firms in this pathway
establish cohesion. This is maintained until 1998 when foreign owners
begin consolidating their subsidiaries.
The firms in pathway 4 are involved in cohesive structures from the
moment of their founding. That is, at the outset of their appearance as
a corporate form they are already participating in dense ownership net-
works. This cohesion, moreover, increases: between 1992 and 1997, the
overwhelming majority of the firms are members of strongly cohesive
groups. This strong cohesion, however, is not a barrier to foreign investors:
by 2001, the firms in this pathway represent 4.9% of overall capitalization
but constitute 12.2% of networked-foreign capitalization.
The enterprises in these two pathways correspond to firms identified
(Stark 1996) as parts of characteristically recombinant property networks.
Based on comparable data collected from registry courts in 1994, com-
plemented by ethnographic research in 1993–94, this earlier research sug-
gested that, for some of these firms, beyond maneuvering in the shadow
of the state, these network ties were facilitating an active restructuring
of assets. That is, recombinant property could involve creative recognition
of resources and their recombination along network lines. From this re-
search conducted during a period of extraordinarily rapid change, it re-
mained an open question whether these network forms of property rep-
resented merely a snapshot of a fleeting process. Our findings, based on
data gathered across 15 years, indicate that this organizational form was
not limited to the years of turbulent transformation, that it has been
robust, and, moreover, that it has been open to a considerable amount of
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foreign investment. By 2001, almost one-quarter of the foreign-controlled
capitalization in Hungary was in enterprises in these two pathways.
Comparing the two processes involving recombinant property forms,
we found that foreign investors clearly preferred the durably cohesive
structures, reaching into the cohesive groups where restructuring of assets
was already taking place. Whereas the more vertical, star-periphery struc-
tures locked in, the more horizontal, collaborative, cohesive structures
could be repurposed, buffering against the uncertainties of postsocialism
in the early period and facilitating further restructuring with foreign par-
ticipation in the later period.14 In contrast to the vertical structures in
which the relationship of peripheral firms was dependent on star centers
and insulated from each other, in the horizontal structures affiliated firms
were legally separated entities but were interdependent units. These col-
laborative structures moved opportunistically, in the best sense of the
term—reaching out to exploit opportunities to capture niche markets. In
the process, they were more likely to be able to reach out to find foreign
investors. Paradoxical only on first glance, it was the more cohesive groups
that were the more outward looking.
If we had found all firms with cohesive recombinant property forms
in pathways 3 and 4, we might conclude that foreign investors who
reached in were then permanently captured. Cohesive networks, in that
case, would prove entanglements that could not be escaped. Pathway 5
indicates that foreign investment could enter into cohesive topographies
and later exit the network. In addition to this late exit another distinctive
feature of this pathway is that its sequence shows an abrupt move from
cohesive positions to isolation. Recall that large enterprises had spun off
firms in the early part of the decade. In 1997 and 1998, some of these
firms, and not only those with foreign ownership, dramatically reconfig-
ured their holdings, shutting down or selling off firms to consolidate their
positions.
Pathway 6 illustrates that not all formerly state-owned firms used re-
combinant network strategies to mitigate uncertainties during the period
of extrication from state socialism. Unlike the firms in the recombinant
pathways, the firms in this pathway, during their long episode of state
ownership, are isolated from any network ties. They are privatized in
1995 and simultaneously enter the network as peripheries of large stars.
Then, after 1996—exactly when the period of institutional uncertainty is
waning—they gain cohesion, which further increases to strong cohesion.
Unlike pathways 3 and 4, however, where cohesion could coexist with
14 Our findings thus offer further support to prior work by Powell et al. (2005) and
Huber and Wo¨rgo¨tter (1998) on performance differences between hierarchically and
collaboratively organized business groups.
This content downloaded from 128.59.160.233 on Fri, 6 Mar 2015 12:50:20 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Network Sequences
1395
foreign participation, in this case, cohesion is not compatible with foreign
investment. In itself, being in a cohesive network—even being in a co-
hesive structure at a critical time—does not ensure foreign investment.
In 1997–98, pathways 3, 4, 5, and 6 are all in cohesive clusters or strongly
cohesive groups. But pathway 6 is considerably less likely to involve
foreign investors.
Creating cohesive networks from the outset has a different meaning
than creating them after a long episode of clutching on to the state. For
the former, dense networks promoted a process of restructuring, a creative
cohesion; for the latter, dense ties fostered a defensive cohesion that, while
not entirely excluding foreign investment, was not as open to it.
Start-ups establishing a foothold.—Whereas the first two processes re-
vealed in table 2 involve firms that begin their careers as state-owned
enterprises or as the spin-offs of these, the third process involves start-
ups. Many of these new start-ups begin their organizational lives with
foreign participation; others quickly acquire foreign investment soon after
their establishment. In the transition framework, such new ventures
would be unlikely candidates for network participation. But foreign in-
vestors were not immune to the uncertainties of postsocialism, and, as
we see in pathways 7, 8, and 9, they too use network ties—especially in
the earlier period of economic transformation up to the middle of the
nineties—as a buffer against uncertainties in policy preferences and
changing institutions.
In these pathways, foreign owners are participating in partnerships with
state-owned firms as well as enterprises whose owner is another Hun-
garian corporation. These three pathways represent best the script ex-
pected by the previously discussed recent literature on foreign investment
in which the foreign actors use network ties as part of strategies for
establishing a foothold in the economy at a time when foreign investors
were not yet commonplace. As we see in the sequences through the space
of local network positions, some of these ties are long lasting, but many
are temporary, terminating as legitimacy is established, regulatory un-
certainties are mitigated, locally specific knowledge is acquired, and op-
erations are running smoothly. In the case of pathway 8, where foreign
companies found new ventures, they tend to cooperate for a relatively
short episode as dyads before buying out the domestic partner and thus
transforming the joint venture into a wholly owned subsidiary. When
foreign investors engage in joint venture strategies with firms that are
embedded in denser network ties (in pathway 7), they tend to stay in
these positions relatively longer before exiting. In pathway 9 the joint
venture survives the entire period, becoming dyads after other ties have
been cut in 1995.
Foreign-led network formation.—Although the overall network tends
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to lose ties and cohesion after 1995, the firms in our fourth group of
pathways go against this trend in a process of foreign-led network
formation.
Like the firms in pathways 1, 3, and 6, the firms in pathway 10 have
the longest histories, beginning as state-owned enterprises from the period
before the regime change. But they also have the longest sequences as
isolates. That is, these firms are not only relative latecomers to privati-
zation, but they were also not involved in interorganizational ownership
ties with other firms while they were state owned. Firms in pathway 10
enter the network after privatization—in marked contrast to the transition
framework that expects that severance of state ownership will be followed
by severance of interorganizational ties.
The newest firms in our population, representing the latest develop-
ments in network processes, are in pathway 11. Although their organi-
zational lives are much shorter than those of the firms in pathway 10,
the two pathways are part of a common process. In each case foreign
investors establish joint ventures, but then alongside increasing foreign
participation comes rearrangement and rebuilding of network ties (in the
sequence of their network positions they move from being in a dyad to
being a part of a star-shaped group). The networking represented by these
pathways is initiated by foreign subsidiaries. These foreign-held compa-
nies are establishing ties with each other and are spinning off their own
subsidiaries. That is, foreign investors in this case are not consolidating
but are expanding the firms’ networks. By 2001, this process of foreign-
led network formation accounted for more than 30% of networked-foreign
capitalization. In this process, we find FDI not as foreign direct insulation
but as foreign-directed embedding.
In the start-up logic, foreign firms create a tie with another company,
learn from it, and then typically cut the ties. In the process of foreign-led
network formation, however, the sequence goes from a simpler to a more
embedded topography. Unlike the earlier, domestic network groups, for-
eign subsidiaries start building networks from the most elementary form
(a dyad) and add ties in a gradual way. The different sequences suggest
responses to different environments: whereas the economic context for
the evolution of domestic networks in the late eighties and early nineties
was radical institutional uncertainty, and the formation of joint ventures
in the early nineties represented a strategy to gain legitimacy in a period
of political uncertainty, the context of the evolution of foreign-initiated
business groups in the midnineties is market competition. In contrast to
firms whose existence predated the collapse of the state-socialist economy,
foreign firms are relatively more isolated and atomized actors in the econ-
omy; nonetheless, they take their positions in chains of inputs and outputs.
Foreign owners decide to secure some of their inputs by establishing
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ownership ties to Hungarian firms and start to build business groups
similar to those that are integral practices in their home countries (Gran-
ovetter 1994; Mizruchi and Galaskiewicz 1994; Podolny 1994; Lincoln,
Gerlach, and Ahmadjian 1996).
In doing so, they come into competition with the homegrown networks
initiated by postsocialist enterprises. The distinction between foreign-
grown versus domestically evolving networks is not only an analytic com-
parison, but one that actors in the field note as well. Our interviews with
corporate consultants indicate that there is often a manifest competition
between foreign firms and domestic business groups to buy shares in a
valuable supplier, thereby tying it to either a domestic or foreign-driven
group.
Isolation.—The fifth process is isolation. Firms in the final pathway
are characterized by a relatively late start; none were ever part of the
ownership network. Smaller than average, these always-isolated firms are
44% of the average firm in all the other pathways. Consequently, although
about half of the firms in our population are in this pathway, they represent
only 30.7% of the population’s capital.
For the population as a whole, foreign investment increased with almost
perfect linearity across the time period.15 But, as the asterisked figures in
table 2 indicate, this linearity in the overall population masks pronounced
punctuation at the level of pathways—a further indication that social
sequence analysis is tapping distinctive processes of foreign investment.
Cohesive recombinants have early, multiple surges of foreign investment,
spin-off star structures have none at all, and the processes of start-ups
and foreign-led network formation show yet different punctuations. Firms
in isolate pathway 12 received a surge of foreign investment in 1997.
Always isolated firms do not have a disproportionate share of foreign
capital: at 30.4%, their share of total foreign capitalization is almost ex-
actly the same as their share of capital altogether (30.7%).
CONCLUSION
By the term “mixed economy,” political economists have typically referred
to a mix of private and state ownership. Those categories remain mean-
ingful, but it is worth reflecting on the extent to which they were part of
the discourse of the Cold War. In that context, the very term “mixed
economy” pointed to a real possibility that a given national economy
might, in actual practice, combine features—of markets and planning, of
15 As a test of linearity we have fitted regression lines to the trends of decreasing state
ownership and increasing foreign ownership. The R2 of a linear trend line is 0.97 for
state ownership and 0.98 for foreign ownership.
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private and public property—that were portrayed not only as antagonistic
but as mutually exclusive.
In this article, we also use the term “mixed economy.” But here we refer
not to a mix of state and private property but to an economy that is a
mix of foreign and domestic, of networked and isolated firms. Yet whereas
we have given the term new content, our intent, at another level, shares
much with that of the earlier coinage, here signaling limitations of either/
or choices in the discourse about globalization. Our findings about Hun-
gary’s contemporary mixed economy show that developing economies do
not necessarily face a forced choice between networks of global reach and
those of local embeddedness. High levels of foreign investment can be
integrated into processes of interorganizational ownership network for-
mation in a developing economy. Just as interorganizational ownership
networks blurred the boundary between state and private ownership in
the early nineties, so, from the midnineties, globally linked and domes-
tically integrated business networks blur the boundary between foreign
and domestic ownership.
How distinctive is Hungary? Do other postsocialist economies show a
similar profile? Is the large firm sector in Russia predominantly networked
and domestic? Across the region, from the Baltics to the Balkans, what
are the national distributions across our four cells of networked domestic,
networked foreign, isolated domestic, and isolated foreign? Our findings
invite comparisons among a broader range of cases in various parts of
the developing world. A new agenda for the sociology of economic de-
velopment would call for investigations on the interaction of foreign in-
vestment and network evolution comparable to that presented for a 15-
year period in Hungary (see fig. 1) in countries such as Argentina, Brazil,
Vietnam, the Philippines, and South Africa. In short, our methodology to
chart the evolving shape of Hungary’s mixed economy provides a strong
basis for further comparative research across a broad range of developing
economies.
The language of “mixed economy,” useful for macrostructural over-
views, we argued, however, should give way to concepts that are more
relational than categorical when attempting to understand the processes
of economic transformation. Our approach to property transformation
beyond a simple transition from state to private ownership but as re-
structurings of network properties is an example of this shift from cate-
gorical to relational concepts. Similarly, in place of thinking about a simple
mix—a whole with identifiably distinctive parts—we think about mixtures
in which the units themselves are combinatory and generative.
Our findings about recombinant property are especially instructive in
this light. The motivating question of this study has been less whether
national ownership patterns can endure than whether they can be adap-
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tive. Networks provide domestic and foreign actors with resources and
opportunities to transform structures. As Powell et al. (2005) demonstrate,
interorganizational ties not only respond to institutional environments,
they can also change them (see also Padgett 2001). Our study of pathways
of property transformation found that the most cohesive type of recom-
binant property is most likely to involve the participation of foreign in-
vestors. This finding indicates that it would be mistaken to characterize
networks of recombinant property as mere holdovers of state socialism,
as reactionary or backward-looking agents that freeze action or resist
change. If they were a legacy of the informal networks of state socialism,
they were not, for that reason, condemned to merely replicate themselves.
Network structures, like other social patternings, can be repurposed. The
cohesive pathways of recombinant property show such generative refor-
mulation (Padgett 2001; Sabel and Zeitlin 1997) with an open potential,
first as agents of asset restructuring and later, as this study demonstrates,
with potential open to foreign investors. Hungary’s transformation from
state socialism to an emerging market economy with sizable foreign in-
vestment did not occur despite its interorganizational property networks
but, in part, because of and through these networks.
To produce a sociological account of historical change, we develop a
social sequence analysis. Network analysis has made important strides in
moving from static to dynamic modeling. Our goal in this article has been
to take the next step—from dynamic network analysis to historical net-
work analysis. We adopt an approach to understanding historical change
that is different from categorical studies of transition (e.g., from state
ownership to private property) and from dynamic modeling of network
systems. In these other approaches, because change is a system-level phe-
nomenon, structure and temporality are both conceptualized at the system
level. In our view, by contrast, the transformation of a national economy
is not a unitary process obeying a single logic but is formed out of the
interweaving of multiple processes with distinctive temporalities (Stark
and Bruszt 2001). Instead of collapsing time to before/after dichotomies
(as in transition models) or introducing time as a variable (as in dynamic
network models), we are alert to the variable structuring of time across
different processes. Thus, in place of properties of the global network, we
focus on variation in local properties. In place of a single system time,
we model the processes of social times. In taking up White’s challenge
in our epigraph to make social times as much a part of structure as are
network spaces, our contribution to a more historical network analysis
does not simply include time as a variable but, instead, recognizes time
as variable.
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APPENDIX A
Methodology: Identifying Significant Foreign Ownership
To assess the distribution of firms according to the concentration/disper-
sion of ownership, we used Ward hierarchical cluster analysis to find
typical patterns of ownership based on the percentage shares held by a
firm’s first largest owner, second largest, third, fourth, and fifth for every
year in which it existed as a company. Because dispersed ownership is
exceedingly rare in our population of the largest enterprises, a two-cluster
model is appropriate for representing ownership structure. An ownership
structure with a dominant owner accounts for 45% of all firm years. In
this first cluster, the dominant owner holds, on average, 98% of the shares,
while the second owner holds less than 2%. Second owners in this cluster
are not classified as significant owners. The second cluster represents a
coalitional structure in which the first owner holds, on average, 51% of
the shares, while the second holds 25%. If either the first or the second
owner of firms in this coalitional cluster is a foreign owner, the firm is
classified as having significant foreign ownership.
APPENDIX B
Methodology: Simulation Test of the Random Change Hypothesis
To test the hypothesis that the network change we record is merely a
result of a random walk process, we run network simulations. For each
pair of years we observed the number of broken ties and new ties. We
can simulate the change of the network from one year to the next by
randomly breaking the same number of ties observed to be broken in the
given year and randomly assigning the same number of new ties observed
to be created. If the frequency of the various local network positions is
not significantly different in our observed data and in the simulations,
we cannot reject that network change from the first year to the next was
a result of a random process.
For each pair of consecutive years from 1987 to 2001 we ran 1,000
random simulations of network change to compare simulated and ob-
served frequencies of dyad, star-periphery, star-center, and cohesive group
local network positions. Throughout the period there are more cohesive
positions and fewer star centers than we would expect by random change.
In the early years (1989–90) and at the very end of our period there are
more dyads and star peripheries than would be expected if the changes
were random. As an illustration, for the cohesive positions we display for
each year the box plots of the frequencies in the simulation together with
the observed frequencies on figure B1. For every year, except 1989 and
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2000, network change from one year to the next produces more cohesion
than we would expect in a random walk process.
APPENDIX C
Methodology: Parameters Used in Optimal Matching
Sequence analysis has recently been criticized by Wu (2000) for using an
algorithm that is insensitive to the direction of transitions. As Wu rightly
points out, a social science of optimal matching analysis must be able to
distinguish the sequence of going from employment to unemployment
from the sequence going from unemployment to employment. Indeed, the
prevalent optimal matching algorithm, adopted from natural sciences,
does not have a concept of temporality built into it. In this appendix we
briefly outline how we modified the optimal matching algorithm to max-
imize the method’s sensitivity to temporal ordering.
Two types of parameters can be adjusted to adapt optimal matching
analysis for our purposes: the cost of inserting or deleting elements (the
indel cost), and the cost of replacing elements (substitution costs; Abbott
and Hrycak 1990). Our aim is to adjust these two parameters so that their
combination maximizes temporal sensitivity.
We start with the extant version of the algorithm (the so-called longest
common subsequence method; Sankoff and Kruskal 1999), as the baseline
version we seek to improve. Sociologists have proposed adjustments to
the cost parameters of the optimal matching algorithm (Abbott 1995;
Blair-Loy 1999; Stovel et al. 1996), but they have not systematically tested
whether and how these adjustments improve temporal sensitivity. We test
these previously proposed adjustments and specify our final cost schedule
to maximize this sensitivity.
We measure temporal similarity between two sequences by a matching
coefficient that counts the matches when two sequences, a and b, were
in the same state in the same year, divided by the length of the shorter
sequence. This metric is one if the two sequences are the same or the
shorter sequence is completely contained within the longer. The metric is
zero if there is no match at all between the two sequences. We use a
second measure to capture reverse temporality. This second measure is a
matching coefficient between sequence a and the reverse of sequence b.
The coefficient is calculated the same way. In this case, a coefficient of
one means that sequence b is the exact reverse of sequence a. Our goal
is to find cost parameters for optimal matching that reward similarity in
temporal ordering and punish similarity in reverse temporal ordering.
We ran optimal matching analyses with various cost parameters, re-
cording the resulting dyadic distance matrices for each. We created a data
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set with dyads as cases (all together there were 359,128 dyads between
the 848 sequences), with optimal matching distances as one set of variables
and the matching and reverse-matching coefficients as another. We then
used linear regression models with optimal matching distance as the de-
pendent variable and the matching and reverse-matching coefficients as
independent variables. Table C1 reports the regression coefficients for four
models, with four different dependent variables: optimal matching dis-
tances with the longest common subsequence approach (model 1), with
the same constant substitution costs and twice as expensive indel cost
(model 2), with a structured substitution cost matrix based on transition
frequencies (model 3), and our final model with a slightly higher indel
cost (model 4).
Our linear regression analysis indicates that the baseline version of the
optimal matching algorithm (the longest common subsequence approach)
is indeed insensitive toward temporal ordering. The coefficients of both
matching and reverse matching are negative, indicating that the algorithm
records a smaller distance between sequences that are similar regardless
of directionality. As the second model indicates, making the cost of in-
sertions and deletions higher effectively increases the sensitivity of the
method for temporal ordering. In model 2 the coefficient for matches is
negative (sequences that go through the same states with the same timing
are closer), while the coefficient of reverse matching becomes positive,
indicating that optimal matching with increased indel cost now penalizes
reverse temporal similarity between sequences. Restating this finding in
terms of the example raised by Wu (2000), we can say that in model 2
the sequence of employment to unemployment is now seen as different
from the sequence of unemployment to employment. The third model
employs a structured substitution cost matrix derived from transition
probabilities (see details below). This model is even less likely to group
sequences with reverse temporality as similar (it has a higher positive
coefficient of reverse matching than in the previous model).
Our final model (model 4) fine-tunes both the substitution cost matrix
and the indel cost. We defined substitution costs in the following way:
the cost of substituting two nonisolate positions is proportional to the
relative frequency of the transitions from one position to the other in the
whole sequence data set. The substitution costs are defined by first cal-
culating transition probabilities:
T1 N (x, y)t,t1tp1
p(x, y)p ,T1 N(x)ttp1
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TABLE C1
Linear Regression Models of Optimal Matching Distances and Matches and













Indel cost . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.00 2.00 2.00 2.01
Substitution costs . . . . . . . . . . Constantp2.00 Constantp2.00 Structured Structured
Linear regression:a
Matches . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18.346 26.903 20.882 20.912
Reverse matches . . . . . . . . . . . 7.046 4.047 5.499 5.658
Constant . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22.790 25.355 19.726 19.753
N . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 359,128 359,128 359,128 359,128
R2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .575 .714 .439 .437
a All coefficients are significant at the level.P ! 0.0001
TABLE C2
Frequency of Transitions between Local Network Positions
I D P L S C G
I . . . . 2,687 167 192 35 19 43 42
D . . . 138 849 79 2 44 8 4
P . . . 167 71 1,342 22 37 91 31
L . . . 18 0 26 181 0 33 1
S . . . 12 28 35 0 353 37 7
C . . . 47 16 100 15 42 497 109
G . . . 44 4 39 8 8 129 462
where x and y are network positions. Then from transition probabilities
the costs are calculated by the following formula:
q(a , b )p 2 p(a , b ) p(b , a ) if a ( b ,i j i j j i i j
where a and b are two sequences. Substitution costs range between zero
and two. A cost of zero only occurs if one network position always follows
the other and vice versa. Although this is not likely, substitution costs
will be low for network positions that very frequently follow one another.
The assumption behind this is that if it is relatively easy to step from one
network position to another, these network positions should make a rel-
atively small difference between sequences. That is, if the only difference
between two sequences is that one of them is in state a at time t, while
the other is in state b at the same time t, then the distance between these
two sequences is a function of the similarity between states a and b, which
is in turn read from the transition frequencies (displayed in table C2).
There are two states that are not substituted with a cost proportional
to transition probabilities: the isolate state and the nonexistence state. We
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I D P L S C G
Dummy
State
I . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 1.00
D . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.00 1.97 1.99 1.90 1.89 2.00 1.00
P . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.00 1.97 1.69 1.87 1.83 1.86 1.00
L . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.00 1.99 1.69 1.97 1.93 1.98 1.00
S . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.00 1.90 1.87 1.97 1.91 2.00 1.00
C . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.00 1.89 1.83 1.93 1.91 1.89 1.00
G . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.00 2.00 1.86 1.98 2.00 1.89 1.00
Dummy state . . . 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
assign a high (maximal, i.e., two) cost to substituting an isolate state.
Because we are interested in ways of participating in the network, the
moment of entering or exiting the network is especially important. We
have made the substitution of an isolate state expensive (a cost of two),
because the distinction between being part of the network and being out
of it is important for us. If the only difference between two sequences is
that one is isolated in year t, and the other is part of the network, this
should make a bigger difference between them than any form of network
participation. We assign a low cost (1) for the substitution of the non-
existence state. In doing so we make the algorithm less sensitive to dif-
ferences in the length of the life of a firm and more sensitive to its network
career. See the final substitution cost matrix in table C3.
To specify the optimal indel cost we run regression models with our
substitution cost matrix, varying the indel cost between 1 and 2.5. We
found that the maximal coefficient for reverse matching (that is, with the
most aversion to grouping sequences with reverse temporality together)
occurs when the indel cost equals 2.01. As displayed in table 3 the co-
efficient for reverse matching for an optimal-matching model with indel
cost 2.01 is 5.658. The coefficients for 2.00 and 2.02 are 5.499 and 5.506.
The 2.01 indel cost equals the maximal substitution cost plus the difference
between the maximal and the second-largest substitution cost, suggested
by Abbot and Hrycak (1990).
APPENDIX D
Methodology: Constructing Ideal-Typical Sequences
We construct ideal-typical sequences to represent each pathway of clus-
tered sequences. Our task is to identify the characteristic states of a path-
way’s ideal-typical sequence, as well as the typical timing of transitions
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Fig. D1.—Scree plot of transition frequencies in pathway 4. The vertical axis shows the frequencies of transitions, the horizontal axis lists transitions
in a descending order of frequency. For example, “G-C” indicates the transition from local position G (strongly cohesive group member) to C (cohesive
cluster member).
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Fig. D2.—Frequencies of characteristic transitions by time in pathway 4, smoothed by a three-year moving average
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between these states. To do so, we analyze the distribution of transitions
by constructing a scree plot that represents the transitions in a decreasing
order of their frequencies. See figure D1 for an example of such a scree
plot, constructed for the fourth pathway.
From this scree plot we identified highly frequent transitions as char-
acteristic features of the pathway. For example, for pathway 4 we iden-
tified the transitions “G-C” (strongly cohesive group member to cohesive
cluster member), and “C-G” (cohesive cluster member to strongly cohesive
group member). To identify the timing in which these characteristic tran-
sitions occurred, we produced plots of the transition frequencies by year,
smoothing with a three-year moving average. Figure D2 presents this
chart for the fourth pathway. In the case of this pathway, we thus chose
1992 as the transition from cohesive to strongly cohesive (C to G), and
1997 as the year for the transition back from strongly cohesive to cohesive
(G to C).
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